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ABSTRACT 
Despite the rich literature concerning information-processing 
models of emotional distress, there is a shortage of evidence 
evaluating the applications of metacognitive strategies in its 
management. The aim of this research was to gain a richer 
understanding of the process by which individuals who 
experience recurrent low mood contextualise and make sense 
of the associated effects of mood on cognition, by exploring 
their experience of metacognition during depressive episodes. 
Other objectives of this research were to explore Wells and 
Matthews (1996) claim that successful strategies for emotional 
distress are effective through being a combination of conferring 
a positive, meaningful context to the experience and through 
directly or indirectly producing a change in the individual’s 
perspective from viewing their distressing thoughts as accurate 
representations of reality (object mode processing) to viewing 
them as transitory mental events (metacognitive mode 
processing). Semi-structured interviews were conducted and 
audio-recorded, using four participants who have a history of 
low mood. Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis was used 
due to its centralising of contexts, meanings and perspectives. 
Three themes were generated, which are explored in relation to 
existing research: (1) A concern with fulfilling external 
expectations and pressures, and meeting personal standards, 
(2) A period of intense embodied emotional and perceptual 
experiences incongruous with the external environment, and 
(3) Making constructive sense of the embodied experiences. 
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Depression: A Cognitive Perspective 
Since its initial explosion onto the scientific agenda (Beck, 1987), there has been a 
consistent interest within psychological research in conceptualising the structure and 
aetiology of depression from a cognitive theoretical standpoint. This broader 
conceptual approach toward studying the mind and mental phenomena is commonly 
used in several research disciplines including neuroscience, philosophy and artificial 
intelligence (Thagaard, 2008). Its must fundamental and unifying hypothesis is that 
mental processes and human cognition can best be understood as the operation of 
mental representations which are analogous to ‘computational data structures’ being 
acted upon by mental processes comparable to ‘computational algorithms’ 
(Thagaard, 2008). 
Though their precise nature has been variously contested (Kriegel, 2014), it is 
generally considered that these mental representations are held internally in the 
mind as models, and are comprised of cognitive symbols which represent features of 
external reality (Morgan, 2013) as images, concepts, logical propositions or rules. On 
one level these models exist as simple abstract mental representations of objects, 
events or actions which are accessible through recall or recognition (Frank et al., 
2014; Winn and Snyder, 2014). On a more advanced level these models can 
represent associative conceptual networks (Watier and Collin, 2012; Winn and 
Snyder, 2014), or complex sets of rules and propositions corresponding to the 
relative arrangement of objects and events such as those which are involved in 
determining the spatial relations of objects (Mani and Johnson-Laird, 1982) or an 
event’s temporal duration (Ulrich et al., 2014). 
These models and the information that they contain also provide a context for ‘how 
we interpret new information, and even direct our attention to particular sources of 
information’ (Winn and Snyder, 2014). Research in this area has evidenced that 
ambiguous information is interpreted in a biased manner according the context 
provided by well-developed models (Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Carey, Harste 
and Smith, 1981). Neisser (1976) has argued further that these structures not only 
affect an individual’s interpretation of information within their environment, but also 
affect their anticipations and expectations which subsequently direct their actions 
within their environment. 
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In extending these theories towards a cognitive account of the psychopathology of 
depression and its relapse, Teasdale et al (1993, 1995) describe this phenomenon 
as the reinstatement and ‘reactivation’ of particular previously held models which are 
equivalent to the specific pessimistic and dysfunctional worldviews which 
characterise episodes of low mood (Gross, 2015). This is hypothesised to occur 
through encountering information which is interpreted to be associative, indicative or 
otherwise related to the negative or maladaptive forms of information held in these 
particular models such as by experiencing mild negative affect or having temporarily 
negative thoughts about the future. This analysis suggests that this configuration can 
become re-established by a wide range of information which is interpreted as having 
negative meaning, and that in the case of vulnerable individuals what would 
otherwise be a transient period of negative thought or feeling is instead ‘transformed 
to a major depressive relapse’. It also suggests that this vulnerability to recurrent 
episodes of low mood may be associated with holding generally negative or 
‘dysfunctional attitudes’ about oneself and the world, which as a prediction has been 
robustly supported by empirical evidence (Teasdale and Dent, 1987; Miranda and 
Persons, 1988; Miranda, Persons and Byers, 1990). Crucially, from the perspective 
of this model therapeutic interventions operate through effectively restructuring the 
individual’s tendency to process and interpret negative thoughts or experiences 
according to the context provided by models related to this ‘depressive configuration’ 
(Teasdale et al., 1995). 
This approach is founded on the theoretical assumption that these models are not 
‘immutable’ or fixed (Winn and Synder, 2014), and are continually verified and 
modified in response to new information in a process described by Piaget as 
‘assimilation and accommodation’ (Inhelder et al., 1976) in order to reach a state of 
coherence or ‘equilibrium’ (Winn and Synder, 2014) between the meaning held in 
these internal structures and the external environment so that effective plans for 
action and goal-facilitation can be made based on their content (Cohen et al., 2011). 
Rumelhart and Norman (1989) have proposed that learning effectively takes place 
either through the creation of new models, as well as through the adjustment of 
existing cognitive structures and processes through either exposure to new 
information or ‘conscious restructuring’. The same authors additionally hypothesise 
that this ‘conscious restructuring’ implies a level of selectivity in examining and 
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evaluating thoughts and beliefs which necessarily implicates metacognition as a 
skillset involved in this process. Overall, this has contributed to a shift in current 
research towards investigating recurrent episodes of low mood through exploring the 
relationship between ruminative thinking behaviours and metacognition (Wells and 
Papageorgiou, 2003). 
Metacognition and Depression 
Metacognition can best be conceptualised as the capacity and associated skills 
necessary to assess, monitor, evaluate or change one’s own cognitive strategies. 
Flavell (1979) proposes an initial distinction between two key aspects; metacognitive 
experiences and metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive experiences are ‘cognitive 
or affective experiences unrelated to current activity’, such as the common 
dissociative phenomenon of mind-wandering, day-dreaming or ‘zoning out’. It is 
proposed by Schooler et al (2011) that this particular aspect of metacognition 
functions as the ‘cyclical activity’ of two main sub-processes, the capacity to 
disengage attention from perception (perceptual decoupling) and the capacity to 
‘take explicit note of the current contents of consciousness’ (meta-awareness). 
 
Metacognitive knowledge has been defined as ‘what we know about our own 
cognitive processes’ (Young and Fry, 2008), and is considered to be constitutive of 
three modes of knowledge (Jacobs and Paris, 1987; Pressley, Borkowski and 
Schneider, 1987; Garner, 1990; Schneider and Artelt, 2010); propositional 
knowledge regarding one’s capabilities and the conditions which influence thinking 
(declarative knowledge), an awareness of the processes involved in thought and 
action (procedural knowledge) and an awareness of when to use particular 
strategies in order to maximise efficiency (conditional knowledge). 
 
Most contemporary research supports Flavell’s (1979) classic view that 
metacognition is a multidimensional construct, but contends that these do not 
necessarily precisely align with his original distinctions. Scraw (1998) for example 
has proposed the addition of metacognitive regulation as a third aspect, it being 
equivalent in Flavell’s (1979) work to metacognitive knowledge that specifically 
concerns the monitoring, evaluation and appropriate selection of cognitive strategies 
to take effective action. This three component model of metacognitive regulation, 
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metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences is supported by Pintrich, 
Wolters and Baxter in their review (2002). 
 
Whereas there is a rich body of literature relating to the potential applications of 
metacognition in an educational context (e.g. Hacker, Dunlosky and Graesser, 1998; 
Pintrich, 2002; Coderre, Wright and McLaughlin, 2010; Sherbino et al., 2011), there 
is a lack of research on its potential applications in managing emotional distress 
despite its usage being previously implicated as being a necessary condition for 
autonomous ‘cognitive restructuring’ of the maladaptive schematic models 
associated with periods of low mood (Rumelhart and Norman, 1989; Teasdale et 
al,1993). 
 
Wells and Matthews’ (1996) S-REF model attempts to explain the role of 
metacognition and ruminative thinking behaviours in the onset and maintenance of 
low mood and anxiety. Wells and Papageorgiou (2003) have argued elsewhere in 
support of a metacognitive based approach in focusing on targeting ruminative 
thinking behaviours in the treatment of low mood, on the basis of several 
comprehensive reviews as well as longitudinal and correlational studies which have 
associated rumination with more severe and longer-lasting periods of low mood 
(Teasdale and Barnard, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Lyubomirsky and Tkach, 
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco and Lyubomirsky, 2008). The S-REF model 
assimilates previous research and posits that emotional disorder such as low mood 
is provoked and maintained through a dysfunctional configuration of cognitive 
processing. In the cognitive architecture proposed by this model, ‘self-regulatory 
processing’ serves two functions; it appraises significance towards specific 
information received from the body and external environment, but also serves a 
‘metacognitive function’ by additionally appraising significance and therefore biasing 
the allocation of processes such as attention and memory retrieval on the basis of 
existing self-beliefs and metacognitions. This is an extension of the cognitive 
hypotheses originally put forward that existing models and beliefs affect an 
individual’s interpretation and allocation of attention toward information (Winn and 
Snyder, 2014), or that this phenomenon can result in the maintenance or recurrence 
of low mood (Teasdale et al, 1993). In practise, from the perspective of this model 
episodes of low mood are maintained through maladaptive metacognitive beliefs 
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which predispose an individual towards engaging in cyclical and cognitively 
demanding coping strategies such as compulsively ruminating on the cause of their 
distress, and a further failure in terms of metacognitive regulation to evaluate the 
usefulness of existing beliefs and strategies. This precise configuration constitutes a 
‘cognitive-attentional syndrome’ which maintains low mood and complicates recovery 
once established due to its pervasive and cognitively-demanding nature, meaning 
that it depletes available resources for processing ‘information which is incompatible 
with dysfunctional beliefs’ (Wells and Matthews, 1996). 
 
Wells et al (1996, 2003) also distinguish between two forms of cognitive processing; 
object mode processing and metacognitive mode processing. In object mode 
processing negative thoughts about the self and future are accepted as ‘accurate 
representations of reality and coping responses are mobilised to deal with the 
negative situation’, whereas in metacognitive mode processing these thoughts are 
experienced as ‘events in the mind that should be treated as objects, and efforts 
should be [instead] devoted to changing one’s relationship with them’. Wells and 
Papageorgiou (2003) propose that it is in metacognitive mode processing of 
maladaptive or dysfunctional beliefs that it is possible to question the validity of these 
beliefs. The implications of this analysis are therefore that the effective resolution of 
low mood involves both examining and challenging existing maladaptive 
metacognitions regarding the usefulness of dysfunctional strategies, as well as 
attempts to increase flexibility in modes of processing negative thoughts in order to 
bring about the possibility for ‘conscious restructuring’ of the overall dysfunctional 
‘processing configuration’ which facilitates and maintains episodes of low mood. 
 
Embodiment and Phenomenology 
It has been argued that previous cognitive models have been hindered by 
conceptual limitations due to their consideration of ‘only limited elements of 
cognition’ (Wells and Matthews, 1996). Contemporary models have gradually 
evolved to become more complex in order to increasingly accommodate the role of 
elements of abstract thought (such as metacognitions) and more sophisticated 
nuances of emotion (Barrett, 2006) in our cognitive processes. Whereas this 
evolution can be seen as a general progression within cognitive psychology, it is also 
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useful to note that this transition can be appreciated within the context of a general 
revival of scientific and philosophical interest during the late 20th century in 
phenomenal consciousness and the structure of conscious experience prompted by 
major contributions from Nagel (1974), Flanagan (1992), Dennet (1993), Marcel and 
Biseach (1998), Searle (1992) and Chalmers (1995). 
This was a substantial development in that it remains in stark contrast to the 
approach generally taken in cognitive science, which has traditionally been 
predominantly concerned with the ‘functional, dynamic or structural properties’ 
(Weisberg, 2008) of mental phenomena. This emphasis on functionalism within the 
context of cognitive science in enormously significant in that it allows for individual 
components in a multi-component system such as the human mind to be ‘discussed 
in the abstract, without commitment to any particular physical entity’ (Quinlan and 
Dyson, 2008), meaning that this shifting of analysis from the level of physical 
structure to the functional level allows for an explanation of how two different 
physical instantiations (i.e. human brains) may underlie the same mental state. 
Furthermore, this emphasis on the functional level of analysis is critical in that it also 
allows mental states, processes and representations within the mind to be specified 
and investigated without a requisite full understanding of the physical structure of the 
brain. Functionalism is therefore critical to the information-processing view of human 
cognition where ‘the mind is to the brain as the program is to the computer’ (Searle, 
1994), which underlies the central hypothesis of mental representation in cognitive 
science (Marr and Vaina, 1982). 
However the leading charge against this point of view is that a functional description 
alone does not present a sufficient explanation for the subjective experience of 
phenomena, or ‘how and why’ the mechanisms of sensory processing should give 
rise to a conscious ‘rich inner experience’ at all (Chalmers, 1995). Far from this 
requirement to address phenomenological experience being, as Dennet has 
criticised (1993), an ‘irrelevant concern’; Marcel and Bisiach (1998) have argued that 
the primary data psychologists examine, as well as the phenomenon which we call 
‘mental life’ is in fact ‘conscious mental life’ and therefore phenomenological. 
Thus as a consequence of an increased scientific interest in conscious experience, 
phenomenology has received new interest as a potential methodology for 
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investigating this experiential dimension (Seidner, 1989; Langdridge, 2007; 
Gallagher and Zahavi, 2012). At the phenomenological level of analysis, the 
construction of any one conscious experience is conceptualised as a fluid and 
dynamic process of interpretation which is affected by abstract and material contexts 
which may be internal or external such as emotion, culture, embodiment, spatiality 
and temporality (Smith, 2013). Conscious experience then, in this sense, does 
consist of sensory input – but it is the sum total of all our possible sense, 
perceptions, contexts and experiences ‘directed at, and responding to events and 
objects in the world’ which comprises our experience of reality (Reynolds, 2004; 
Jensen and Moran, 2013; Low, 2013; Merleau-Ponty, 2014). 
Interpretation and ‘Meaning-making’  
It has been variously proposed that the way we interpret our experiences and the 
meaning we invest in them – particularly abnormal or distressing ones such as 
anxiety, psychosis or low mood – deeply affects our experience of their features 
(Fulford and Jackson, 1997; Fallot, 2007; Phillips and Stein, 2007). The literature is 
rich with variance in the phenomenology of episodes of low mood, ranging from it 
being experienced as an incapacitating disease (Erskine, 2010), a source of 
recognition and hope (Karp, 1994), a source of spiritual insight (Smith, 1999) or 
containing the potential for powerful transformative growth (Karp, 1994).This 
variance suggests that it is possible to form a consistent internal interpretation of a 
period of distress which contains meaning which confers a purposeful or even 
positive context upon the experience, as opposed to a context which centralises 
pathology or abnormality. 
Wells and Matthew (2003) argue that the mechanism behind the effectiveness of 
many of these different interpretations being contributive to recovery and resilience 
against future episodes of low mood is that they indirectly lead to metacognitive 
mode processing of distressing thoughts, as is the case with mindfulness-based 
interventions for managing emotional distress such as Attentional Training 
(Papageorgiou and Wells, 2000) or Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal et 
al., 2001) which have received empirical support (Piet and Hougaard, 2011; Kuyken 
et al., 2015). It may be the case that adaptive and functional interpretations of 
recurrent periods of low mood are effective through a combination of conferring a 
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significant or meaningful context to the experience, and practical skills-training by 
leading to metacognitive mode processing of its related thoughts. However there are 
no studies in this area. Wells and Matthew’s (1996) incorporation of metacognition in 
their work recognises the role of different modalities of thought and perception as 
contributive to our construction and experience of reality, which may help guide 
future approaches. However many other existing cognitive models which attempt to 
answer fundamental questions do not take into account all of the possible contexts 
which inform our conscious experience of the effect of mood on cognition and in that 
sense may be profoundly limited. This research therefore aims to gain a richer 
understanding of the means by which individuals who experience recurrent low 
mood contextualise and make sense of the associated effects of mood on cognition, 
by exploring their experience of metacognition during these episodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page	11	of	33	
	
Methodology  
Design 
The aim of this study was to explore participant’s experience of metacognition during 
episodes of low mood, and its relation to how these episodes are interpreted and 
subsequently contextualised. As this involves exploring the mental processes by 
which participants ‘build, verify and modify mental models to account for a relatively 
novel set of events’ (Cohen et al., 2011) such as the effect of mood on cognition, 
qualitative methods were considered the most appropriate methodology to explore 
the experience of low mood on cognition and the processes involved in interpreting 
this series of events (Brocki and Wearden, 2004; Smith, 2011). 
Participants 
Guided by Howitt and Cramer’s (2011) suggestions and Smith and Osborn’s (2008) 
recommendations for an IPA study, the purposive sampling method was used to 
recruit as homogenous a sample as possible that also satisfied the inclusion criteria 
(Chapman and Smith, 2002). Four individuals (between 19 and 26 years of age) 
participated in this study, within the guidelines recommended by Smith and Osborn 
(2008) for an undergraduate research project. It has also been suggested by Smith, 
Flowers and Larkin (2009) that a sample size in an IPA study is inversely 
proportional to the gathering of rich, complex data. Two of these participants were 
known previously to the researcher, which aided in discussing sensitive topics, the 
ethical implications of which are discussed elsewhere in this report. 
All participants were of similar educational background, either currently studying at 
undergraduate level or having had graduated within the past year. There were no 
restrictions regarding participant’s ethnicity, gender identity or sexual orientation as 
these factors did not relate to the aims of the research, which also meant that there 
were ‘meaningful points of similarity and difference’ amongst participants (Smith, 
Flowers and Larkin, 2009). A particular strength of this research was that there were 
an equal number of male and female participants, which suggests that the results 
are correspondingly equally meaningful when applied to both genders (Denmark et 
al., 1988). The inclusion criteria for this study were that individuals be an adult (over 
18 years of age), have had experience with at least one period of low mood within 
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the past three years but not be experiencing current symptoms and that they are 
capable of providing a description of the effect of emotion on their thoughts during 
this period, and how they have interpreted the experience. 
Researcher 
The researcher is a twenty-one year old male studying a BSc Psychology with 
Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University, and has experienced a period of 
low mood one year previous to commencing the study. The researcher has been 
interested in the psychological experience of low mood for four years, and had some 
basic previous knowledge. The researcher additionally has been similarly interested 
in the philosophical and historical foundations of psychology for the previous 18 
months. 
Materials and Apparatus 
A seven question interview schedule was constructed (see Appendix D) was used as 
a guide during the interview process, which was based on theoretical knowledge of 
metacognition that addressed the aims of the study. Additional influences upon its 
construction were factors found by Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997), and 
supported by Spada and Wells (2008) and Papageorgiou and Wells (2001) to be of 
particular relevance to metacognition and emotional distress. 
All interviews were audio-recorded using a digital recorder, and all recordings and 
transcripts were stored on a password-protected laptop and removed following 
completion of the journal report. Participants also received a Participant Information 
Sheet (see Appendix B) with an attached Informed Consent Form (see Appendix C) 
before the interview was conducted, and a Debriefing Sheet afterwards (see 
Appendix E). 
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Procedure 
Data Collection 
Semi-structured interviews were considered as the most appropriate method of data 
analysis for this study on the basis that they impose the essential structure 
necessary for generating appropriately valid data necessary for a rich analysis 
(Wengraf, 2001), whilst also allowing for the spontaneity to satisfy the philosophical 
aims of IPA, ‘whereby initial questions are modified in the light of the participant’s 
responses and the investigator is able to probe interesting and important areas 
which arise’ (Smith and Osborn, 2008). Interview questions concentrate on the 
participant’s experience of the effects of mood on cognition and metacognition during 
periods of low mood, as well as their retrospective experience of interpreting this 
series of events. 
It has been suggested that depression and negative affect may negatively correlate 
with disclosing emotionally distressing experiences (Kahn et al., 2012). Therefore, in 
order to minimise the effect of this variable the interview setting was determined by 
where participants felt the most comfortable talking about sensitive and potentially 
distressing experiences. Three participants were interviewed in the Brooks Building 
of the university campus, and one participant was interviewed in the Student’s Union 
building for Manchester Metropolitan University. Each interview lasted for around 45 
minutes, so as to gain sufficiently rich and valid data for analysis. 
Means of Analysis  
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis was used for this study, which aims to 
combine an idiographic method of interpreting and understanding a participant’s 
experience whilst maintaining a critical and sceptical hermeneutic (Gill, 2014). This 
approach was considered to be the most appropriate towards the aims of this 
research on the basis of three justifications: 
Phenomenological psychology, being intellectually connected to the sociological 
perspective of symbolic internationalism (Denzin, 2001) as a result of its influence on 
psychological research (Sheldon and Vyron, 2003), shares its central concern with 
exploring the construction of personal and social meaning (Bryman, 1988). In 
practise this concern with ‘sense-making’ (Smith, Osborn and Flowers, 1997) and 
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the construction of both kinds of meaning naturally emphasises the role of cognition 
and mental processes, in a manner consistent with Brunner’s (1990) work in the 
same area. Therefore, phenomenology has a legitimate ‘theoretical alliance’ with 
cognitive psychology (Smith and Osborn, 2008). 
Furthermore, the mental processes involved in interpreting and making sense of 
events and experiences have been suggested to be ongoing, social and affected by 
retrospection (Weick, 1995). Therefore, the phenomenological approach, whereupon 
the researcher is engaged in a double-hermeneutic of attempting to ‘make sense of 
the participants trying to make sense of their world’ whilst also adopting a critical 
approach (Smith, 1991), was deemed the most appropriate for investigating these 
phenomena. Finally, a quantitative approach is epistemologically limited in its ability 
to principally investigate and adequately address how mood and cognition contribute 
to meaningful experience. The phenomenological approach has a unique theoretical 
commitment to the individual as an embodied being, as well as affective and 
cognitive (Smith, 1996; Eatough and Smith, 2006), meaning that it is acknowledged 
that multiple internal and external, as well as abstract or material, inputs are 
integrated to produce an intricate and dynamic experience of reality (Merleau-Ponty, 
2014). Thus given the aims of this research, the use of explorative, qualitative 
methods was preferred in order to gain an ideographic understanding of how 
participants experience the effects of mood and cognition (Biggerstaff and 
Thompson, 2008) as ‘a complex act of interpretation according to context’ (Gallagher 
and Zahavi, 2012). 
The interviews were transcribed by the researcher, before being analysed for 
meaning according to the phenomenological approach. The transcripts were read 
several times in order to establish a close understanding of the text as a whole, 
whilst documenting and coding initial associations, interpretations, comments, 
contradictions and similarities in the data (see Appendix F). These codes formed 
initial units of meaning which were then assembled into clusters, taking into account 
meaningful variance as well as convergence, resulting in a coherent list of 
preliminary themes (see Figure 1): 
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Figure 1 – List of Preliminary Themes 
Altered, confusing or seemingly irrational perceptions 
Attempts to control self and emotions 
Concern for fulfilling expectations and responsibilities 
Concern for maintaining personal standards and external appearances 
Cyclical internal discourse 
Disparity between embodied psychological and emotional needs and demands of 
external environment 
Embodied emotional sensations containing valuable suggestions or indicators 
Embodied emotional sensations not as something to be controlled or restricted 
Embodied emotional sensations as something that should be listened to 
Environment full of threats and external pressures 
Episode of low mood containing transformational meaning 
Identification of recurrent, consistent negative embodied emotional sensations as 
holding ontological meaning 
Identifies and invests value in self-management  
Increased capacity for psychological resilience 
Intense, dysphoric sensations during episodes of low mood 
Journey or process towards making sense of embodied emotional sensations 
New perspective of positive metacognitions towards embodied emotional sensations 
Period of intense conflict between internal experiences and external environment 
Realisation and acceptance of limitations of trying to control emotional sensations 
Time experienced as a series of chaotic, rapid changes 
Time experienced as a series of progressive changes 
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At this point, themes which were not rich in evidence were eliminated in order to 
provide a list of subordinate themes (see Figure 2) which are discussed elsewhere in 
this report in relation to existing theoretical and experimental research. 
Ethical Considerations 
This research has conformed to the code of ethics outlined by the British 
Psychological Society which details the core principals of ethical psychological 
research, and was approved in accordance with these guidelines by the MMU 
Psychology department based on information supplied in the Application for Ethical 
Approval Form (see Appendix A). 
Participants who expressed interest through email and social media were sent a 
formal Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix B) via email, and were invited to 
choose a time and date for an appointment. This document explains their rights as a 
participant should they decide to take part, the purpose and aims of the research, the 
conditions of anonymity and confidentiality regarding their data and confirms their 
consent to participation. It also explicitly states that any data provided cannot be 
treated as confidential, as it must be shared with the research supervisor, and 
quotes from the interview will be used in the journal report. Participants are also 
reminded that they will be allocated a pseudonym, and that any data shared during 
the data collection process which could be used to identify the participant (such as 
the name of a friend or family member) will be omitted from the transcription process. 
All copies of the interviews and other materials were destroyed upon completing the 
research. 
Upon completion of the interview, participants were given a formal Debriefing Sheet 
(see Appendix E), which reiterates their rights to withdraw their data and the 
conditions of confidentiality and anonymity regarding their data. This document also 
recognises the possibility of strong emotions being evoked during the interview and 
following participation. In order to protect participants from any potential harm as a 
result of their taking part, they are referred to several organisations including the 
universities’ Counselling and Wellbeing Service if the feel they require psychological 
support in the future. 
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Analysis & Discussion  
The analytic process involved in IPA generated overarching patterns of meaning for 
each transcript. As a feature of the interpretive process, subordinate themes which 
emerged as a result from verbatim transcripts were appraised priority on the basis of 
several considerations. These include the prevalence of available evidence, as well 
as the richness of this evidence in terms of its ability to communicate the meaning 
held in participant’s experiences and its association to other accounts. 
In doing so, three main superordinate master themes emerged from the data which 
offer an introductory, descriptive account of the processes by which participants 
contextualise and make sense of the effects of mood on cognition in recurrent 
episodes of low mood: (1) A concern with fulfilling external expectations and 
pressures, and meeting personal standards, (2) A period of intense embodied 
emotional and perceptual experiences incongruous with the external environment 
and (3) Making constructive sense of the embodied experiences: 
 
Code Master Theme 
1.1 A concern with fulfilling external expectations and pressures, and 
meeting personal standards 
2.1 A period of intense embodied emotional and perceptual experiences 
incongruous with the external environment 
3.1 Making constructive sense of the embodied experiences 
Figure 2 – List of Master Themes 
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Theme One: A concern with fulfilling external expectations and pressures, and 
meeting personal standards 
All participants strongly identified an overwhelming sensation of intense pressure as 
a feature of their environment, either as an antecedent or property of their episode of 
low mood. However, between the four participants opinion differs significantly as to 
the origin of these sensations. 
For some participants this originates clearly from the external environment: 
‘I knew that I’d obviously had have to maintain my grades to get there and 
stuff. […] It got to the point where I was crying my eyes out to sleep at night, 
and obviously I thought, ‘This is not right, I’ve still got to be here’ and stuff. […] 
I essentially wanted to be in isolation, but my life couldn’t accommodate that – 
I had to be here, I had responsibilities that made me stay here.’ (Philippa, 29- 
30; 39-40; 80-82) 
And, like, I kind of got depressed when, like, everyone sort of grew up a bit 
more than I did – and, like, accepted adult responsibilities and went and did 
adult things and, like, like – just, erm, just sort of did things that I didn’t want to 
do yet and it kind of got quite depressing.’ (Dorian, 20-24) 
It is of interest to note that in Dorian’s account these are experienced as both 
involuntary and existential, in that they cannot easily be resisted or ignored: 
‘Everyone’s growing up and you still don’t want to grow up yourself, and 
there’s not a lot you can do in that situation.’ (Dorian, 69-71) 
These experiences are felt as inescapable, or as critical but meaningful struggles in 
which it is unacceptable to fail in (‘I still maintained a base level standard, that people 
wouldn’t essentially pick up on, or know quite significantly – unless I told them.’ 
Philippa, 228-230). 
Across all accounts, the intensely negative emotional sensations related to 
experiencing low mood pose a significant obstacle to meeting these expectations 
and pressures (‘I missed a lot of college […] It was a spiralling staircase really.’ 
Dorian 150-152). 
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In some accounts participants react to this by attempting to exercise more control 
over their actions and emotions (‘I knew […] I’d actually have to address the 
situation.’ Philippa, 31-32). Philippa’s account illustrates how in practise this strategy 
was particularly conflicting for participants who valued self-care (‘I needed time to 
recuperate alone and collect my own thoughts, and just be myself but it just wasn’t 
possible at the time.’ Philippa, 46-48). This extract exemplifies her wish for 
withdrawal which she feels her environment does not allow her to act on, effectively 
creating a disconnect between exercising self-care towards her embodied needs for 
occasional withdrawal and rest. 
Contrastingly, Alice’s account describes how some participants attempted to 
exercise control over their experience through ruminating on the cause of their 
distress as to minimise its impact (‘And I’d try to see why I became like that.’ Alice, 
115). However, the precise way in which Alice initially perceives her distress as a 
recurrent ontological feature of her embodied mental life (‘They told me I had 
depression […] and I put myself in that category.’ Alice, 81-86) also enables this type 
of learned knowledge to be used heuristically as an ‘implicit belief about the case of 
negative events’ (Chaiken, Liberman and Eagley, 1989), leading to a sense of 
frustration related to her perception of not being in control of her emotions. 
Furthermore Clarkson et al (2011) argue that confidence in the validity of thoughts is 
a mediating variable at the metacognitive level in determining their overall 
believability (Brinol, Petty and Rucker, 2006; Rucker, Petty and Briñol, 2008), and is 
primarily affected by the perceived credibility of the information source (Briñol and 
Petty, 2005; Tormala, Briñol and Petty, 2006; Tormala, Briñol and Petty, 2007) such 
as a medical professional. 
 
Theme Two: A period of intense embodied emotional and perceptual experiences 
incongruous with the external environment 
The experience of low mood prompted intensely dysphoric emotional sensations. In 
addition to the anhedonia and alienation which typically distinguish low mood, this 
response is characterised by feelings of disorder, incongruity and internal confusion, 
consistent with descriptions in the literature (Lane and Terry, 2000): 
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‘When it came to my art I couldn’t express myself […] I saw myself as being 
extremely different to everyone else […] I wasn’t stable at all. Like, not even 
my thoughts, or my reactions or my actions – none of it was stable.’ (Alice, 78-
79; 128-129; 157-158) 
 
‘I felt like everything was false […]? Like, a lot of the things that people 
express are false, like certain concepts like people feeling affection towards 
one another; people being generous and so on, that these things were false.’ 
(Wendy, 80-83) 
 
Most participants also identify a sense of disparity or distortion between their 
perceptions and external reality. (‘But afterwards, when I’d rationalised it, I’d come 
back into my own, logical thinking – I was fine.’ Philippa, 179-180) (‘Yeah I guess, 
erm, b-because it almost, it just felt like there was two different ways of looking at the 
world.’ Wendy, 47-48). 
 
 
Theme Three: Making constructive sense of the embodied experiences 
 
It is of interest that participants across all accounts create a narrative allowing them 
to make sense of their experience. A number of participants expressed their 
perception that retrospectively, their experience of low mood can best be understood 
as part of a series of progressive changes contributive to the development of their 
current perspective: 
‘At the end of the day, you’re evolving […] that’s the whole point, of […] 
wanting to become something better. […] When you’re moving forward, you’re 
becoming something new. And when I realised that thought, I wanted to be 
better.’ (Alice, 355-369) 
Following their experience of low mood, all participants also felt a profound 
difference in their relationship to their emotional needs and limitations in their 
embodied experience: 
‘I can judge my emotion and how that makes me feel, erm, it helps me know 
what’s good and bad for me, essentially.’ (Philippa, 300-301) 
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Philippa’s account shows how she no longer perceives these needs as something to 
attempt to exercise control over. This perspective of viewing these embodied 
sensations as something to be listened to is expressed in all accounts, with 
participants feeling appreciative of their function and role in embodied mental life (‘I’ll 
always listen to what I’m feeling, and take it all on board.’ Dorian, 103-104) (‘It’s a bit 
more strategic now than it is emotional. I would still put my emotion in, but in a more 
strategic. Alice, 618-619). 
 
Some participants also perceive the root cause of their distress as being in 
previously attempting to impose control on these sensations: 
‘It’s thinking you can control something when you can’t, and whether that’s, 
like controlling someone’s attachment to you […], or controlling the world in 
some way. Erm, that’s where it seems to come from, I think.’ (Wendy, 239- 
243) 
Also of interest is that participants express that this perspective relates to a wider 
sense of ownership regarding their emotional wellbeing (‘Also if I know that 
something’s having a negative […] impact on me, erm, and then on my mood – I will 
withdraw from that.’ Philippa, 285-287) (‘Emotion is […] the basic thing you should 
look at, at the end of the day, because that affects your logic.’ Alice, 554-555) 
As a result of this development, all participants express feeling more equipped to 
interpret difficult thoughts and situations constructively. In practise, most participants 
perceive themselves to be more resilient as a consequence of their experience (‘I 
still have similar problems to what made me feel that way in the first place, […] and I 
don’t care because I’m better than the situation.’ Dorian, 247-250) (‘I don’t care why 
something happened, […] I just see if I can fix it and if I can’t I just ignore it […] I 
would accept that it happened.’ Alice, 524-528). Furthermore, through being more 
sensitive towards their own embodied sensations they are more able to practise self-
care, especially in difficult situations (‘But when you actually learn how to speak to 
yourself, you organise your thoughts a little bit.’ Alice, 593-594) (‘I think it’s important 
– that you can recognise your own emotions […] and to understand yourself, as and 
to when you are going into low mood.’ Philippa, 366-370). 
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This description is consistent with cognitive flexibility, an established psychological 
correlate associated with resilience (Major et al., 1998; Dumont and Provost, 1999; 
Steinhardt and Dolbier, 2008; Genet and Siemer, 2011) associated with a decreased 
risk of recurrent low mood (Edward, 2005; Smith, 2009). These findings can be 
interpreted as support for Wells and Matthews (2003) claim that functional 
interpretations of episodes of low mood are effective through a combination of 
conferring a significant or meaningful context to the experience, and practical skills-
training by leading to metacognitive mode processing of its related thoughts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page	23	of	33	
	
Limitations 
One of the most important limitations of this study is that it did not assess 
participants for measurement of individual differences in metacognitive beliefs and 
monitoring strategies, even though according to Wells et al (2004) the MCQ-30 is a 
reliable measure of these constructs. It would have been beneficial to collect 
information regarding participant’s metacognitive beliefs before the interview stage, 
as this would have limited the amount of inferences made during the data analysis 
stage and contributed to a more accurate understanding. 
It has also been suggested previously that a limitation of studies which employ 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis is that they are simply ‘too descriptive’ 
(Langdridge, 2007) and that this avoidance of making definite claims restricts the 
value of their findings. However, other research has evidenced that IPA studies have 
directly contributed to advancements in theory and practise within public health and 
nursing (Brocki and Wearden, 2006; Langdridge, 2007; Biggerstaff and Thompson, 
2008; Pringle et al., 2011; Smith, 2011). Furthermore as Smith (2011) argues, one of 
the aims of IPA is to ‘illuminate and illustrate’ existing fields and areas of research, in 
order to deepen understanding. 
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Reflexive Analysis 
Whereas I was always certain that my own emotional history would pose no 
implications towards this study, it was initially my concern that any preconceived 
ideas I had arrived at through my basic previous knowledge would impose 
themselves upon the data, which is contrary to the means of analysis in IPA. 
However, through a process of personal reflection and journaling (Moustakas, 1994) 
I was able to make clear these initial assumptions, as well as acknowledge and 
reflect on their possible interaction in the ‘intersubjective dynamic between 
researcher and data’ (Rathwell and Young, 2015). In doing this, I was able to 
eliminate this concern and fully embrace the interpretive nature of IPA (Larkin, Watts 
and Clifton, 2006). 
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